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Cleantism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy
CHAPTER ONE

Delivery in Argentina and Chile

PARTISAN LINKAGES AND SOCIAL POLICY
First, we describe the formation of party-voter linkages in Latin America, which are characterized by policy-affinity traits. In the following section, we explain how these existing partisan linkages shape the distributive expectations of voters in Latin America. We then analyze policy-voter linkages in Argentina and Chile and conclude by discussing the policy implications of our analysis.

Argentina and Chile

In a chapter relationship, we described the non-programmatic distribution of partisan benefits to the entire mass of voters on the societal grounds and as political fit. The literature on Latin American political parties has always emphasized their non-programmatic distribution of political benefits and their impact on the distribution of publicly funded benefits. In doing so, we assume that voter demands are not static but change over time in response to political events and institutional changes. Our research, based on our analysis of survey data in the 1990s, highlights the importance of distributive issues on the design of political parties and their strategies in using private goods to consolidate power. This chapter provides empirical evidence for the claims made by political scientists regarding the relationship between political parties and the distribution of resources. We argue that political parties are not just political organizations but also institutions that influence the distribution of benefits. In our view, parties are strategic actors who shape the distribution of resources to achieve their goals. The combination of these factors explains the importance of party-voter linkages in shaping the distributive expectations of voters in Latin America.
Voters' distributive expectations result from their prior interactions with political networks. As described in the ethnographic literature, the idea of network centrality is central to understanding how individuals are connected to others and how these connections influence their access to resources. In turn, these networks shape which public policies matter to voters. For instance, in the context of distributive politics, access to benefits is often determined by one's membership in particular networks, such as policy groups, interest groups, or political parties.

This distinction is important because it highlights the role of networks in shaping policy preferences. In the analysis of voter behavior, networks can influence how individuals perceive and prioritize different policy outcomes. For example, in the context of education, voters who belong to specific interest groups may place a higher value on policies aimed at improving educational standards than those who do not. Similarly, in the context of healthcare, individuals who are connected to particular networks may be more likely to support policies that expand access to healthcare services.

We argue that the role of networks in shaping policy preferences is not limited to the specific outcomes they are associated with. Instead, networks can also influence how individuals perceive the importance of different policy outcomes. For instance, in the context of economic policies, networks can shape how individuals perceive the impact of economic policies on their personal circumstances. This is because individuals who belong to particular networks may have a more favorable view of policies that benefit those networks, even if they are not directly affected by them.

In conclusion, the role of networks in shaping voter behavior is complex and multi-dimensional. Networks can influence how individuals perceive and prioritize different policy outcomes, and this can have a significant impact on the policy preferences of voters. Understanding the role of networks in shaping voter behavior is crucial for understanding how policies are implemented and how they are perceived by the public.
weighting parties' distributive promises, voters internalize the impact of personal
and organizational constraints that shape the delivery of publicly funded benefits. 
Voters' distributive promises depend on the additive combination of goods
and services available to them. Preferences and skills can yield different benefits from these networks.

In sum, the different types of linkages we observe in those countries
and between and within societies, in the following ways we expect variation in 
how these networks affect the distribution of goods and services. 

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Learning in Children from Latin America

We made a few changes for the benefit of our readers. In particular, we removed some sections that were not relevant to our audience. Additionally, we added a few new paragraphs to provide more context and clarity. The revised version is as follows:


In addition to our previous emphasis on the importance of education, we now also highlight the role of parents in supporting their children's learning. This is particularly important in Latin America, where traditional family structures and values play a significant role in shaping educational outcomes. Parents who are actively involved in their children's education can have a profound impact on their children's academic performance and future success.

Furthermore, we have added a section on the impact of technology on education in Latin America. While technological advancements have made education more accessible to children in many parts of the world, the situation in Latin America is more complex. Despite the availability of digital resources and online learning platforms, many children in the region lack access to the necessary technology to fully benefit from these tools.

We believe that addressing these challenges requires a multi-faceted approach that involves not only educators and parents but also policymakers, community leaders, and local organizations. By working together, we can create a more inclusive and effective education system for children in Latin America.
Given the differences in the institutional constraints for using political networks for the distribution of public funds benefits, we need to assess the ability of voters to either use ideology or rely on their proximity to political organizations to inform their distribution expectations.

Using an original survey, we show how Chileans could identify the ideological positions of parties and how these positions are related to their perceived proximity to those parties. We find that party identification and endorsement are strong predictors of respondents' beliefs about the distribution of public funds benefits and the likelihood of using political networks to obtain them. However, these beliefs are not always consistent with actual political behavior. 

In summary, ideological identities play a role in shaping the relationship between voters and their elected representatives. However, the strength of this relationship depends on various factors, including the political context, the quality of information available to voters, and the efficacy of the electoral system in linking voters with the political actors they support.”
The number of registered patents in China is increasing, with more than 100,000 patents filed there in 2020. This is a reflection of the country's growing innovation and technological capabilities. However, the number of patents granted by foreign countries is still higher, especially in the United States and Japan.

In terms of patent quality, China has made significant progress in recent years. The number of high-quality patents has increased, reflecting the country's efforts to strengthen its intellectual property protection system. However, there is still room for improvement, and China needs to continue to improve its patent examination process to ensure that only high-quality patents are granted.

Notably, the number of international patents filed by Chinese companies has also increased, indicating that Chinese enterprises are becoming more active in the global patent market.

In conclusion, China's patent system has made significant progress in recent years. However, there is still room for improvement, and the country needs to continue to strengthen its intellectual property protection system to further support innovation and technological progress.
The combination of institutional constraints on policy delivery party organization and ideological identification by voters leads us to expect that voters would be more likely to ratify the party in the current Argentine political system. We have argued that ideological differences between parties could use ideology to frame the distribution of public goods to the benefit of the party and for the DC. Our findings thus confirm the expectations of the DC. The combination of institutional constraints on policy delivery party organization and ideological identification by voters leads us to expect that voters would be more likely to ratify the party in the current Argentine political system. We have argued that ideological differences between parties could use ideology to frame the distribution of public goods to the benefit of the party and for the DC. Our findings thus confirm the expectations of the DC. 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Lesson for Social Policy Design

such as efforts to reduce the negative effects of exposure to violent video games, which can lead to aggression and anti-social behavior. By increasing knowledge about the potential consequences of social media use among youth, policymakers can develop targeted interventions aimed at reducing these negative effects. It is also important to recognize the role of social media in shaping the political landscape, as evidenced by the widespread use of social media during recent political campaigns. These findings highlight the need for ongoing research on the impact of social media on political behavior and attitudes, which can inform future policy decisions.