

**ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS**  
Political Science, G6403  
Columbia University, Fall 2009  
Tuesday: 2.10 – 4.00  
Location IAB 902

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**COURSE OVERVIEW**

This seminar exposes students to the main questions motivating research in comparative politics, but it is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the classic works in the field. Students are expected to read closely and are encouraged, both in class discussions and in their written work, to critically evaluate the literature and to think of ways to improve upon it.

This course is intended for PhD students preparing for their qualifying exams and enrollment is limited. Doctoral students will be given priority and the requirements of the PhD program will be considered if it is necessary to establish priority among them.

**REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION**

The requirements are as follows:

*Class Participation – 20% of the final grade.* Students are expected to read the assigned works closely and will be graded on both their knowledge of the material and their contributions in the seminar.

*3 Response Papers – 10% of the final grade each – Every four weeks, the student should submit a short paper, which is due at 9am the Monday before class.* Response papers will advance an argument related to one of the readings for the week. The best papers will make an original argument and present a critical summary of the existing research on a question raised in that week. The papers need not cover all the readings in a given week, but they do need to present an argument based on those readings. All research papers are due by 9am on the Monday before class and should be posted on the class website on Courseworks. Students will be expected to be familiar with their colleagues' papers.

*Practice Comp – December 2<sup>nd</sup> - 50 % of the final grade.* In the final class session students will have an hour to answer one out of three questions posed.

## READINGS

### Session 1: Introduction

### Session 2: Approaches to the Study of Motivations

- Arrow, Kenneth. 1994. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. *American Economic Review* 84 (2):1-9.
- Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1990. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. In *The Limits of Rationality* edited by K. Cook and M. Levi. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Colin Camerer. 2006. Behavioral Economics". In Blundell, Richard et. Al. 2006. *Advances in Economics and Econometrics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 181- 212.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. The Renaissance of Political Culture. *American Political Science Review* 82 (4):1203-1230.
- Wedeen, Lisa. 2002. Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science. *American Political Science Review* 96 (4):713-728.
- Anne Swidler, 1986 "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (April): 273-286.

### Recommended

- Frieden, Jeffrey, and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies. In *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, edited by H. V. Milner and R. O. Keohane. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Becker, Gary. 1993. Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior. *Journal of Political Economy* 101 (3):385-409.

### Session 3: Approaches to the Study of Institutions

- Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. *Political Studies* 44 (5):936–957.
- Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:69-404
- Weingast, Barry. 2002. Rational Choice Institutionalism. In *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, edited by I. Katznelson and H. Milner. New York: Norton.
- Grief, Avner, and David Laitin. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4):633-652.
- Hacker, Jacob. "Policy Drift: The Hidden Politics of US Welfare State Retrenchment" in W.Streeck and K.Thelen (eds.) *Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*. Oxford UP 2005
- Murillo, Victoria and Levitsky, Steven. 2008. Variation in Institutional Strength. Forthcoming. *Annual Review of Political Science*.

### Recommended

- Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. Institutionalism as a Methodology. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15 (2):123-144.
- Calvert, Randall. 1995. Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions. In *Explaining Social Institutions*, edited by J. Knight and I. Sened. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
- Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen. 2005. Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced

Political Economies. In *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, edited by W. Streeck and K. Thelen. New York: Oxford University Press.

#### **Session 4: The State**

- Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion Capital and European States AD 990-1992*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, Chapters 1-3.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 9-96.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1980. *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapter 4 & Conclusion.
- Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1.
- North, Douglass. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: W.W. Norton, Chapter 3.
- Peter B. Evans. 1989. "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State," *Sociological Forum* 4: 561-587.
- Sokoloff, Kenneth and Zolt, Eric. 2005. Inequality and the institutions of taxation: evidence from the economic history of the Americas. Manuscript, UCLA

#### **Recommended**

- Reno, William. 1997. War, Markets, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa's Weak States. *Comparative Politics* 29 (4):493-510.
- Poggi, Gianfranco. 1990. *The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ch1 – 4.

#### **Session 5: Political Regimes**

- Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapters 1.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-3.
- Luebbert, Gregory. 1987. Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe. *World Politics* July 1987.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1, 4 & 6.
- O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter P. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 -3.

#### **Recommended**

- Epstein, David, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006.

- Democratic Transitions. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3):551-69.
- Kuran, Timur. 1991. Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics* 44 (1):7-48.
- Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model. *Comparative Politics* 2:337-63.
- Weingast, Barry. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. *American Political Science Review* 91 (2 (June)):245-263.

### **Session 6: Interest Organization and Representation**

- Cameron, David. 1984. Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society, In Goldthorpe, John, ed. *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 143- 178.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2001. Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. *International Organization* 55 (1):1-46.
- Economic Studies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1, 2 & 6.
- Mares, I. 2001. *The Politics of Social Risk*, New York: Cambridge UP, chapter 2.
- Iversen, T. and David Soskice. "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preference" 2001. *American Political Science Review* vol.95, No.4: 875-893.
- Gehlbach, Scott, 2008. *Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States*, Cambridge UP, pages to be assigned.
- Murillo, M.Victoria 2000. "From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin America", *World Politics* 52/2.

### **Session 7: Identity Politics**

- Gellner, Ernest. 1964. Nationalism. In *Thought and Change*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Anderson, Benedict R. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, Chapters 1-3.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 5 & 8.
- Fearon, James D., and David Laitin. 1996. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 90 (4):715-735.
- Laitin, David. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Chapters 1-3.
- Darden, Keith and Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2006. The Great Divide: Literacy, nationalism and the communist collapse. *World Politics*. 59: 1, 83-115.

### **Recommended**

- Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2.
- Bates, Robert H. 1983. Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics. In *State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, edited by D. Rothchild and V. A. Olunsorola. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. Counting Heads: A Theory of Elite and Voter Behavior in Patronage Democracies In *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by H. Kitschelt and S. I. Wilkinson. New York: Cambridge

University Press.

### **Session 8: Collective Action and Contentious Mobilization**

- McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 1997. Towards and Integrated Perspective on Social Movement and Revolutions. In *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, edited by M. I. Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Granovetter, Mark 1978. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. *American Journal of Sociology*(6):1420-1443.
- Scott, James C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapters 1 & 7.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 7 & 9.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97 (1):75-90.
- Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapter 2.
- Humphreys, Macartam and Jeremy Weinstein, 2008. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War" *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 5, No.2: 436-455.

### **Recommended**

- Popkin, Samuel L. 1988. Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam. In *Rationality and Revolution*, edited by M. Taylor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.
- Wilkinson, Steven I. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.
- Ellis, Stephen. 1999. *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* New York, NY: New York University Press, Chapters 6 & 7.
- Horowitz, David L. 2001. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Chapters 1 & 13.

### **Session 9: Political Institutions**

- Shugart, Matthew, and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1 and 12.
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (3):289-325.
- Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. The competitive road to proportional representation: partisan biases and electoral regimes under increasing party competition. *World Politics*. 61:2, 254- 295.
- Cusack, Thomas R. , Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. *American Political Science Review* 101 (3):373-391.

- Moe, Terry. 1995. The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy. In *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond* edited by O. E. Williamson. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Huber, John D. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-2 & 4.
- Rodden, Johnathan. 2006. *Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-3.

### **Recommended**

- Riker, William. 1964. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* Boston, MA: Little Brown, Chapters 1 & 2.
- Cox, Gary, and Scott Morgenstern. 2001. Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents. *Comparative Politics* 33 (2).
- John Londregan. 2000. *Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., Chapters 1-3.

### **No Session (11/4) ELECTION DAY.**

### **Session 10: Parties and Elections**

- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count : Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-3.
- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapter 1 and 2.
- Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage Structure, Party System and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, edited by S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan. New York: Free Press.
- Murillo, Maria Victoria, and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo. 2007. Political Competition and Policy Adoption: Market Reforms in Latin American Public Utilities. *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1). CHANGE
- Hibbs, Douglas. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", *American Political Science Review*: 1467-87.
- Stokes, Susan. 1999. "What Do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy?" in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin, *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge University Press.
- Keefer, Phil and Khemani, Stuti. 2009. When do legislators pass on pork? The role of political parties in determining legislator effort. *American Political Science Review*, 103: 1, 99- 112

### **Recommended**

- Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes. 1999. Elections and Representation. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by B. Manin, A. Przeworski and S. Stokes. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Chapters 1, 3 & 4.
- Boix, Carles. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *American Political Science Review* 93 (3):609-624.
- Boix, Carles. 1998. *Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic*

- Economic Strategies in the World Economy*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-2.
- Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapters 1 & 2.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 1998. From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon. *Comparative Politics* 30 (3).
- Shefter, Martin. 1994. *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.

### **Session 11: Political Economy I: Interests and Coalitions**

- Iversen, Torben. 1996. Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics* 28 (4):399-436.
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1.
- Swenson, Peter. 1991. Bringing Capital Back in, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden. *World Politics* 43 (7):513-544.
- Huber, Evelyne and John Stephens 2001. *Development and the Crisis of the Welfare State*. University of Chicago Press, chapters 1-3.
- Bates, Robert H. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The political basis of agricultural policies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 101 (1).
- Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert. 2009. *Development, democracy and welfare states*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pages1- 78.

### **Recommended**

- Pierson, Paul 2001. Coping With Permanent Austerity Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies. In *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, edited by P. Pierson. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

### **Session 12: Political Economy II: The impact of regimes and institutions**

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review* 91 (5):1369-1401.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3.
- Keefer, Philip. 2004. What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development - and Vice Versa? *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:247-272.
- Frye, Timothy. 2002. The Perils of Polarization: Economic Performance in the Postcommunist World. *World Politics* 54 (3):308-337.
- Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice. 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 1.
- Schneider, Ben Ross and Soskice, David. 2009. Inequality in developed countries and Latin America:

coordinated, liberal and hierarchical systems. *Economy and Society*. 38:1, 17- 52.

Schrank, Andrew. 2009. Understanding Latin American political economy; varieties of capitalism or fiscal sociology? *Economy and Society*. 38: 1, 53- 61

### **Recommended**

Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. *Political Economics : Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press., Chapter 14.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 7.

Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. The Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. *Journal of Development Economics* 79 (2):447-468

Weinthal, Erika, and Pauline Luong Jones. 2006. Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth. *Perspectives on Politics* 4 (1):35-53.

Hellman, Joel. 1998. Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions. *World Politics* 50 (2):203-234.

### **Session 13: Practice Comp**