

DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS-G8442

Instructor: Prof. M.Victoria Murillo

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Office hours: Weds 2-3:30pm.

Meeting time for the class: Thursday 12:10-2pm

Objectives:

This PhD seminar will focus on democratic responsiveness to voters from the perspective of comparative politics. Along with accountability, responsiveness is a crucial component of representative democracy as it relates voters' preferences to politicians' offers or policy choices. As voters select their representatives, they seek their attention. However, politicians do not pay equal attention to all voters; nor do they respond to voters' demands exclusively by following their policy preferences. Even when seeking to maximize votes, politicians' linkages to voters are quite diverse depending on the political context. This class focuses on democratic responsiveness seeking to assess its empirical operationalization and its implications with an emphasis on electoral mechanisms linking voters and politicians in representative democracies. Departing from a theoretical discussion of the concept, we will analyze the diverse dimensions affecting voters' decisions—including ideological and non-ideological dimensions—to assess the incentives of political parties to respond to voters' policy preferences or to supply other political offers. In so doing, we will discuss the process of policy preference formation as well as congruence between politicians and voters' preferences and the impact of voter heterogeneity of politicians' strategy of vote maximization. The emphasis of the class is on theory analysis, application to puzzles of interest to students, and testing with the expectations that final papers will be used as an opportunity for exploring theory building, hypothesis generation, and concept operationalization on topics related to democratic responsiveness.

Class requirements

- Class participation: graduate students will be graded for the class participation based on their critical reading of the required texts. The grade for class participation also includes the evaluation of the presentation of the third short paper.
- 3 short papers discussed below. **All The short-papers are due either in the instructor office or by email 24hs before the class meeting (Wednesday at noon).**
 - One short paper (2-3 double-space pages), which does not summarize the arguments of the week but make a cogent argument providing a critical viewpoint of the one or more of the readings discussed in that section.
 - One short paper (2-3 double space pages), which using one of the theories discussed that week, derives a testable hypothesis for an empirical puzzle of interest for the student but not discussed by the literature.
 - One short paper (3-4 double space pages) on concept operationalization. This paper should derive a hypothesis from a theory discussed that week and describe the operationalization of the relevant variables to test it, including a discussion of empirical indicators and their expected range of variation. This paper includes a 5 minute presentation in class.

- Paper proposal (5-6 pages) stating the puzzle of your research paper, your hypothesis and alternative hypothesis derived from the literature discussed in class as well as your research design. Paper proposals are due on week 12. The topic should be approved by the instructor. Paper proposals will be presented and discussed with colleagues in class.
- Final paper (25-35 double space pages, 12 point font, normal margins), which is due a week after the last class meeting. Any type of methodology can be used in testing your argument, but you should provide empirical evidence for your argument.

Class Schedule

Week 1: presentation (9/5)

Week 2: Democracy and Electoral Representation (9/12)

- Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. Chapter XXI "The Classical Doctrine of Democracy," Chapter XXII "Another Theory of Democracy," and Chapter XXIII "The Inference."
- Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes, "Elections and Representation" in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes (eds), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge UP 1999, 29-54.
- James Fearon, "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance" in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes (eds), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge UP 1999, p.55-97.

Week 3: Ideology and Policy Responsiveness (9/19)

- Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Harpers & Brothers 1957), chapters 3, 7 and 8.
- Susan Stokes, "What Do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy?" in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes (eds), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge UP 1999, p.98-132.
- Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, "How Can Governments Be Accountable If Voters Vote Ideologically?" in Jose M. Maravall and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca (eds). *Controlling Governments. Voters, Institutions and Accountability* (Cambridge UP 2008), p. 45-81.
- James Adams, "Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence", *Annual Review of Political Science* 15/1 (2012).
- Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Margarita Corral, "Individual and Contextual Constraints in Ideological Labels in Latin America," *Comparative Political Studies* (2012) 46/6, 675-701.

Week 4: Non-Spatial Determinants of the Vote I: Valence, Partisanship and Networks (9/26)

- Donald Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition", *American Political Science Review* 57/2 (1963).

- David Sanders, Harold Clarke, Marianne Stuart, and Paul Whiteley, "Downs, Stokes and the Dynamics of Electoral Choice," *British Journal of Political Science* (2011) 41, 287-314.
- Noam Lupu, "Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina," *American Journal of Political Science* (2013) 57/1, 49-64.
- Ted Brader, Joshua Tucker, and Dominik Duell, "Which Parties Can Lead Opinion: Experimental Evidence on Partisan Cue Taking in Multiparty Democracies", *Comparative Political Studies*, forthcoming 2013.
- Baker, Andy, Barry Ames, and Lucio R. Renno. 2006. "Social Context and Campaign Volatility in New Democracies: Networks and Neighborhoods in Brazil's 2002 Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* no. 50 (2):382-399.

Week 5: Non-Policy Determinants of the Vote II: Competence, Economic Performance & Economic Constraints (10/3)

- Raymond Duch and Randolph Stephenson. *The Economic Vote* (Cambridge 2008), chapters 1, 2, 3, and 6.
- Duch, Raymond. 2001. "A Developmental Model of Heterogeneous Economic Voting in New Democracies." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 4, pp. 895-910
- Geoffrey Evans and Robert Andersen, "The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions", *Journal of Politics* (2006) 68/1, 194-207.
- Alcañiz, Isabella, and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. "Who's to Blame? The Distribution of Responsibility in Developing Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* no. 41 (02):389-411.
- Daniela Campello, "The Politics of Financial Boom and Crisis. Evidence from Latin America", *Comparative Political Studies*, forthcoming 2013.

Week 6: Non-Policy Determinants of the Vote III: Targeted Distribution (10/10)

- Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, "Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game", *The Journal of Politics* 48/2 (1986).
- Avinash Dixit and John Londregan, "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics", *The Journal of Politics* 58/4 (1996).
- Kanchan Chandra, "Counting heads: a theory of voter and elite behavior in patronage democracies" in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (eds). *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge UP 2007), p. 84-109.
- Beatriz Magaloni, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, and Federico Estevez, "Clientelism and portfolio diversification: a model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico" in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (eds). *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge UP 2007), p. 182-205.
- Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2012. "What wins votes: Why some politicians opt out of clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Calvo, E., and Murillo, M.V., "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," *American Journal of Political Science* 48:4 (October 2004): 742-757.

Week 7: Congruence on Policy Preferences (10/17)

- Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *The American Political Science Review* no. 57 (1):45-56.
- James Stimson, "Party Government and Responsiveness" in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes (eds), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge UP 1999, p 197-221.
- Jeffrey Lax and Justin Phillips, "The Democratic Deficit in the States", *American Journal of Political Science* (2012) 56, 1: 148-166.
- Jeff Manza and Faly L. Cook. 2002. "A Democratic Polity? Three Views of Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion in the US" *American Politics Research* 30 (6): 630-67.

Week 8: Discussing Public Opinion and Policy Preferences (10/24)

- Donald Kinder, "Communications and Politics in the Age of Information" in David Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis (eds) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford UP (2003), p.357-393.
- Charles Taber, "Information Processing and Public Opinion" in David Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis (eds) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford UP (2003), p.433-472.
- John Zaller (1991), "Information, Values and Opinion", *American Political Science Review* 85 (4), 1215-1237.
- Tomz, Michael, and Robert P Van Houweling. 2009. "The electoral implications of candidate ambiguity." *American Political Science Review* no. 103 (01):83-98.
- Michael Hiscox (2006); "Through a Glass and Darkly: Framing Effects and Individuals' Attitudes towards International Trade." *International Organization* 60 (3): 755-780.
- Ardanaz, Martin, M.Victoria Murillo and Pablo Pinto. 2013. "Sensitivity to Issue Framing on Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey Experiment," *International Organization* 67/2 (April), 411-437.

Week 9: The Supply Side of Responsiveness: Political Parties and Electoral Competition (10/31)

- James Adams, Samuel Merrill, and Bernard Grofman, *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: a cross-national analysis integrating spatial and behavioral factors* (2005), chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4.
- Norman Schofield and Itai Sened, *Multiparty Democracy. Elections and Legislative Politics*, Cambridge 2006, chapters 1 and 2.
- Wolfgang Muller and Kaare Strom, *Policy, Office or Voters?* (Cambridge UP 1999), chapter 1.
- Calvo and Murillo, Responsiveness and Responsibility, unpublished manuscript, chapters TBA.

Week 10: Institutions & Party Dynamics (11/7)

- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The transformation of European social democracy, Cambridge studies in comparative politics*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, chapter 5.
- Jose Maria Maravall, "The Political Consequences of Internal Party Democracy" in Jose M. Maravall and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca (eds). *Controlling Governments. Voters, Institutions and Accountability* (Cambridge UP 2008), p. 157-201.

- David Samuels and Matthew Shugart, *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers* (Cambridge UP 2011), chapter 8.
- Gary Cox (1990) "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems", *American Journal of Political Science* 34/1.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* no. 55 (1):27-41.

Week 11: Inequality and Biased Responsiveness (11/14)

- Marty Gilens, "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness", *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69/5 (2005).
- Larry Bartels, *Unequal Democracy. The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. (Princeton 2008), chapters TBA
- O'Donnell, G., "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Issues," World Development 21, No 8 (1993): 1355-1369.
- Juan Pablo Luna, *Segmented Representation. Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies*, unpublished manuscript, chapters TBA.

Week 12: paper proposal presentations (11/21)

11/8 - Thanksgiving.

Week 13: Applications: Latin American Party Strategies: Institutions, Policy, and Valence (12/5).

- Hagopian, F., Gervasoni, C., and Moraes, J.A., "From Patronage to Program: The Emergence of Party-Oriented Legislators in Brazil," Comparative Political Studies 42, No. 3 (March 2009), pp. 360-391.
- Remmer, K., "The Politics of Institutional Change: Electoral Reform in Latin America, 1978-2002." Party Politics 14, No. 1 (2008): 5-30.
- Baker, A., and Greene, K., "The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free-Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies," World Politics 63:1 (January 2011): 43-77.
- Domínguez, J.I., and McCann, J.A., "Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: The Construction of Party Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections," American Political Science Review 89 no. 1 (March 1995), pp. 34-48.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2013. "When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile." *Comparative Political Studies*.